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ABSTRACT
This article examines interest group conflicts surrounding the financial
transaction tax (FTT) debate in the European Union (EU). Specifically, it
focuses on the advocacy efforts of EU-based ﬁnancial industry groups at
different stages of the policy debate. The article provides a detailed
description of changes to the post-crisis regulatory environment and points to
public salience as important factor that can constrain business power. Much
in line with the existing literature, industry groups did not fare very well
under conditions of high salience and public pressure during the agenda-
setting stage. However, this article also shows that in order to get back on its
feet, the financial sector lobby had to employ a combination of quiet and
noisy politics during later stages of the policy process. As soon as the
contextual conditions provided by the financial crisis started to fade away,
industry groups were able to bounce back by using a framing strategy that
linked their arguments against an FTT to broader societal goals, by
disseminating scientific evidence and by building coalitions with business
groups outside of finance in order to water-down the proposed directive.
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Introduction
A large public coalition between civil society organizations, trade unions and
some member states’ governments demanded the introduction of a financial
transaction tax (FTT) in order to make the financial sector pay its fair share for
economic recovery after the 2008 financial crisis. So, in January 2013, 11 euro-
zone countries came up with an ambitious reform proposal that included a
broad-based tax with very few exemptions. Massive industry lobbying has
since successfully watered down the Commission proposal, which now
resembles a narrow tax with many exemptions for various financial instru-
ments. Despite continued statements of support for such a tax by heads of
state and governmentm as well as finance ministers of participating
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member states renewing their political commitment to an FTT, a start date in
2017 has become increasingly unlikely (KPMG 2016).
Froma theoretical point of view, the lobby success of the financial industry is
somewhat surprising. Culpepper’s (2011) distinction among ‘quiet’ and ‘noisy’
politics suggests that, in particular, under conditions of noisy politics when the
public pays attention, highly organized business groups oftentimes lose,
whereas under conditions of quiet politics, when interest group politics take
place behind closed doors, business groups prevail. Applying his theory to
post-crisis politics, Culpepper (2011: 197) predicted ‘a weakened bargaining
position’ for organized interests in a ‘radically changed political environment’
and ‘under intense public scrutiny’. Accordingly, scholars found that the finan-
cial crisis and the public outrage it caused was a catalyst in changing interest
group dynamics that at least temporarily weakened the financial sector
(Baker 2010; Clapp and Helleiner 2012; Kastner 2014; Orban 2016; Steinlin
and Trampusch 2012; Woll 2013; Young 2013). How, then, can we explain the
lobbying success of financial industry groups on a highly salient issue such
as the FTT?
This articlewill showthat inorder togetbackon its feet, industrygroupshad to
employ a combination of quiet and noisy business politics. By examining a case
where chances for industry groups to succeed in their lobbying efforts were low
(or least likely), as the FTT with its important re-distributional consequences and
high popular support, this article will shed light on a question that has so far
largely been ignored by the literature, namely: how industry lobbyists were
able to use noisy politics in response to the financial crisis to their advantage.1
This article also provides an important contribution to the existing international
political economy (IPE) literature, which has so far largely ignored the effects
of the crisis on industry groups’ lobbying capacity (Pagliari and Young 2013).
Process-tracing will be used in order to open the black box of preference
attainment of interest groups. The analysis here closely follows methodologi-
cal guidelines as suggested by Trampusch and Palier (2016) and Bennett and
Checkel (2015). The empirical account draws on 65 semi-structured qualitative
interviews with financial lobbyists, policy-makers and pro-reform advocates at
EU level. For the selection of respondents, I followed a non-probability or pur-
posive sampling approach (Mason 2002: 97). Hence, I interviewed senior-level
élites that had detailed knowledge of the negotiations that took place, such as
Commission officials, members of the European Parliament (MEPs), their
policy advisors and affected lobbying groups. In order to measure interest
group influence, interest groups’ stated goals were compared (as a proxy
for their true policy positions), triangulated with contextual information
retrieved from public statements and submissions to public consultations,
as well as the financial press and interviews with other actors involved in
the debate (Mahoney 2007: 37). In the case study, regulatory change was sys-
tematically gauged against groups’ advocacy goals.
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The article is structured as follows: the next section will briefly present the
existing literature on industry influence and financial reforms. The subsequent
section will outline the main characteristics of the proposed legislation as pre-
sented by the European Commission. After a brief description of the main
competing camps in the policy debate, the article describes the changes to
the regulatory environment and traces the lobbying efforts. The final
section briefly summarizes the main findings and concludes.
Theoretical approaches on financial reforms
The sizable literature on interest groups reminds us that more resourceful
actors have a much better chance of getting their voice heard than less
well-resourced groups (Eising 2007: 356). This is even more so in the field of
finance, where financial industry groups enjoy a structurally privileged pos-
ition owing to the rise of finance capitalism (Streeck 2014). Hacker and
Pierson (2010), for instance, argue that the organizational capacity of resour-
ceful private interests to bring public policy in line with their interests
accounts for overly industry-friendly regulatory politics in the United States
(US), especially in the field of finance. However, in particular, in situations of
high public salience, electoral considerations motivate politicians to listen
less to business lobbies and more to the electorate (Culpepper 2011: 7). Simi-
larly, Smith (2000) finds that a united business lobby might still lose because
issues they jointly mobilize for are likely to be accompanied by increased
public attention and by the counter-mobilization of public interest groups.
This in turn amplifies electoral motives for decisions-makers to act in the
public interest rather than pander to business preferences. Numerous
studies, mostly focused on the American political system, testify to the recur-
ring success of weak interests such as workers, consumer or public interest
groups in spite of a conflict with more powerful business groups (Grossmann
2012; Smith 2000; Trumbull 2012; Vogel 1997). For the European Union, Dür
et al. (2013) find that business groups are less influential than citizen
groups during the decision-making stage, and in particular when policy
issues are highly conflictual.
According to a recent strand of IPE research, the financial crisis had several
important effects that at least temporarily weakened financial sector groups.
First and foremost, the post-crisis financial regulatory environment was gen-
erally marked by increased issue salience and negative publicity for the finan-
cial sector. Quaglia (2010) observed that the circle of actors involved in
financial regulatory policy-making has become less restricted. Scholars have
generally emphasized populist pressures on policy-makers together with an
increased awareness of the distributional consequences of regulatory failures
owing to the crisis as driving force for more stringent regulation of the finan-
cial sector. Baker (2010: 656) observed that ‘lobbying capacity and voice of
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bank lobbies are not what they were prior to the crisis. Their oppositional atti-
tudes to regulation are softening, while regulators are emboldened.’
Heightened media attention raised by the financial crisis certainly
increased the perception of undue industry influence. Clearly this loss of legiti-
macy of the financial sector also extended to big corporations deemed
responsible for increasing inequality and economic insecurity as well as to
governments, especially the EU, seen as too responsive to business pressure.
Several studies stressed how this de-legitimization and increased public atten-
tion, in turn, led to a change in lobbying strategies, with industry groups
refraining from vetoing policy proposals (Steinlin and Trampusch 2012;
Young 2014), focusing their attention on different stages of the policy cycle
or on the reversal of legislative decisions during the implementation stage
(Young 2013). Woll (2013) argues that public outrage forced hedge fund
industry lobbyists to adapt their strategies to governments’ preferences.
Increased actor plurality, closely linked to and motivated by heightened
issue salience, is a second factor that can account for decreasing industry
influence. Quantitative analyses confirm that the mobilization of interest
groups beyond financial groups in the regulatory debate following the crisis
increased in the EU (Eising et al. 2013). The literature identifies two differing
effects of increased actor plurality in financial reform debates: increased
actor plurality might either allow industry groups to form coalitions with sup-
portive non-industry groups to leverage their influence (Pagliari and Young
2013: 6); or it might have the opposite effect and reduce industry impact
on regulatory politics when outsider groups successfully oppose industry pre-
ferences as a ‘countervailing force’ (Clapp and Helleiner 2012). Kastner (2014:
1), for example, argues that ‘a polymorphous network of civil society organiz-
ations was able to gain momentum after the ﬁnancial crisis and to inﬂuence
the ﬁnancial reform process’.
Noisy business politics
What all the above approaches have in common is their recognition that
business power can be considerably curbed by conditions of high salience.
A recent study on EU politics confirmed that business groups are less influen-
tial than citizen groups during the decision-making stage, and in particular
when policy issues are highly conflictual (Dür et al. 2013: 33). Business inter-
ests can, however, also take advantage of highly salient and conflictual
issues by expanding the battlefield to non-financial groups and by tying
their arguments to a broader societal goal. Trumbull’s (2012) argument that
the ability of public interest groups to make policy appear legitimate accounts
for their increased policy influence, especially when decision-makers are
under public scrutiny, might also hold for industry groups. Similarly to
citizen groups, industry groups can seek an outside lobbying campaign
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(whereby interest groups go beyond the legislative arena to lobby policy-
makers with media activity or the mobilization of grassroots) if they can suc-
cessfully frame their demands by linking them to a broader public interest,
such as keeping costs for consumers low or avoid damaging consequences
for growth and corporate activity. This strategy of ‘noisy business politics’
has largely been overlooked in the business power literature (Keller 2016).
This article will show how industry groups, in order to achieve their lobbying
goals, employed a expertise-based framing strategy (Boräng and Naurin 2015)
that linked their arguments against an FTT to the broader societal goal of
economic growth.
Regulatory change and group influence
In September 2011, the Commission adopted a proposal for a Council direc-
tive on a common financial transaction tax to be implemented by 1 January
2014 across the then 27 member states in order to (1) to avoid a fragmenta-
tion of the internal market; (2) to ensure that the financial sector makes a fair
contribution to recover the costs of the financial crisis, as well as to compen-
sate for the ‘under-taxation’ of the financial sector owing to the value added
tax (VAT) exemption; (3) to create disincentives for high-frequency trading
(HFT); and (4) to enable the development of an FTT at global level.2 After
an EU-wide introduction of an FTT as advocated by civil society groups and
proposed by the Commission in its initial draft Directive in September 2011
was rejected by a majority of member states, including the United Kingdom
(UK), Sweden and Luxembourg, a sub-group of 11 member states, spear-
headed by France and Germany, decided in January 2013 to go ahead by
introducing the FTT with enhanced co-operation that would only bind parti-
cipating member states.
The Commission’s comprehensive tax proposals following an ‘all insti-
tutions, all markets, all instruments’ approach (Schulmeister 2014) reflected
important advocacy demands of pro-tax activists. Largely in line with activists’
preferences, the proposed tax had a wide scope, including derivatives and
pension funds.3 The tax would be levied on all financial transactions
between financial institutions when at least one party to the transaction is
located in the EU (‘residence principle’). The tax proposal only included a
few exemptions. To avoid individual citizens being negatively affected, the
scope of the proposal excluded most consumer products, such as insurance
contracts, mortgage lending and consumer credit. The proposal included a
harmonized minimum of 0.1 per cent tax rate on shares and bonds and of
0.01 per cent on derivatives with revenues generated being shared
between the EU and member states. The Commission estimated that the
tax would raise around 57 billion euros every year (European Commission
2011). The Commission’s second proposal for 11 countries mirrored the
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scope and objectives of its original FTT proposal. After lobbying of pro-tax
activists for an anti-avoidance measure to prevent relocation of financial
activities, the second Commission proposal complemented the residence
principle with an ‘issuance principle’, whereby the tax would also be levied
on financial institutions based in non-FTT jurisdictions when they trade in
financial instruments that are issued in FTT jurisdictions (Grahl and Lysandrou
2013). Although pro-tax group demands for an even higher tax rate of 0.5 per
cent, as well as for using revenues generated by the FTT to fund international
development, were not reflected in the Commission proposal, the draft direc-
tives were very close to their advocacy goals (Wahl 2014).
After the initial victory of civil society groups, member states made little
progress towards implementation. Negotiations on the FTT in the Commis-
sion’s formal indirect taxation working party amongst the then EU27 as well
as in informal meetings among the participating eleven member states
were subject to massive lobbying by the financial services sector, which led
to political gridlock and made the introduction of a broad-based FTT increas-
ingly unlikely (Zimmermann 2014: 3). The German government was known to
advocate a broad scope with few exemptions, while France and Italy advo-
cated a smaller scope with an exemption for bonds, certain types of deriva-
tives and repos.4 Having introduced their national transaction taxes in 2012
and 2013 respectively, France and Italy started to promote their versions of
the tax at EU level.
In May 2014, then, 10 participating eurozone countries announced in a
joint declaration the progressive introduction of a scaled back version of
the original FTT proposal, that would ‘first focus on the taxation of shares
and some derivatives’ (Financial Times 2014). Despite the official rhetoric of
the participating member states in January 2015 ‘that the tax should be
based on the principle of the widest possible base and low rates’ (ECOFIN
Council 2015), it now seems likely that the draft directive will be significantly
less ambitious than the original Commission proposal and end up as a narrow-
based FTT, similar to the 0.5 per cent UK stamp duty reserve tax on a limited
number of transactions. The FTT has largely been emptied of its critical
elements and is now likely to miss the mark of effectively tackling speculative
trading (Schulmeister 2014; Zimmerman 2014). Council working group meet-
ings throughout 2016 revealed significant differences among the 10 remain-
ing participants (with Estonia having dropped out), the implementation of an
FTT any time soon becomes even more questionable.
Policy debate and actor plurality
The political debate about an EU FTT was the subject of vocal and widespread
campaigns by civil society activists. Pro-tax campaigns, such as the German
‘Steuer gegen Armut’, the Italian ‘ZeroZeroCinque’, the Spanish ‘La Tasa
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Robin Hood’ and the British ‘Robin Hood Tax Campaign’, promoting a small
tax on the financial sector with its revenue attributed to public finances as
well as global development assistance, mobilized to pressure policy-makers.
In September 2009, several non-governmental organizations (NGOs), includ-
ing World Economy, Ecology and Development (WEED), Stamp out Poverty,
War on Want, Terre des Hommes and national groups of the Association for
the Taxation of financial Transactions and Citizen’s Action, sent a letter to
the G20 urging heads of state and government to implement an international
FTT ‘to pay for the cost of the crisis in the north’, ‘to assist countries in the
South to meet their development objectives’, and to ‘contribute to a reduction
in speculation’ (WEED 2009). By late 2009, early 2010, national campaigns in
support of such a tax – dubbed a ‘Robin Hood Tax’, spanning not only cur-
rency transactions, but all sorts of financial instruments – were initiated by
civil society groups, which were successful in gathering widespread political
support in Germany, Italy and the UK. When prospects for the introduction
of a global or EU-wide tax faded, groups mobilized for an FTT via enhanced
co-operation, with revenues to be shared between international develop-
ment, member states and the EU.
Conversely, and unsurprisingly, tremendous opposition to the FTT proposal
came from the banking industry. From the very beginning, financial industry
groups were unified in their opposition to an FTT. In the words of one lobbyist,
‘all … financial institutions agreed that we completely disagree.’5 The day the
Commission presented its proposal for the introduction of an EU-wide FTT in
September 2011, the Financial Times headline read: ‘Business attacks trans-
action tax plan.’ According to the article, ‘the proposal has been fiercely
resisted by financial and business interests in Europe, pointing to a fierce pol-
itical battle that lies ahead’ (Financial Times 2011). After it had become clear
that 11 member states were going ahead with its implementation and the
likelihood of legislative success increased, industry groups intensified their
lobbying against the legislative proposal to implement an FTT.6 The proposal
was subsequently substantially watered down during negotiations among
member states, which started in February 2013. Nevertheless, the decision
to introduce a policy directed at penalizing the financial sector speaks to
the inability of industry groups to affect the policy agenda in line with their
preferences. How can we explain the initial failure of industry groups to
derail an EU FTT, despite their unified opposition?
The post-crisis financial regulatory environment: high salience
politics7
In the post-crisis context, heads of states and governments, and notably
French president Nicolas Sarkozy and German chancellor Angela Merkel,
became interested in the FTT as a populist policy measure to appease
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public opinion. Increased public attention on financial reform also made the
regulatory dialogue less conducive to private sector influence. By tracing the
use of the phrase ‘financial transaction tax’ in newspapers, the increase in
issues salience is clearly visible in Germany, France and the UK (Figure 1).8
With Merkel and Sarkozy at the forefront of the pro-tax camp, the FTT received
most media attention in Germany and France. Media attention was consider-
ably less in the UK, a country that opted out of the coalition of 11 countries
proceeding with the introduction of an FTT. Media attention notably increased
in 2011 with the FTT rising to the political agenda of the G20 meeting in
Cannes in November that year. This was followed by a spike in attention in
2012, with the European Parliament (EP) voting in favour of an EU-wide
FTT in May 2012 and 11 member states announcing their commitment to
introduce an FTT via enhanced co-operation in June 2012, after failed
Council negotiations for an EU-wide solution.
A public opinion poll carried out by the International Trade Union Confed-
eration (ITUC) in June 2012 offers further evidence of the high salience of the
FTT debate in Europe. Only 12 per cent of respondents in France indicated
that they had never heard of a tax on financial transactions. About 30 per
cent of respondents in Belgium, Greece and Germany and 37 per cent of
Figure 1. News coverage of the financial transaction tax. Source: Factiva.
Notes: Articles containing the search term “financial transaction tax” in British as well as
US newspapers, “taxe sur les transactions financières” in the French language press and
“Finanztransaktionssteuer” in the German language press, which refer to the relevant
groupings of major publications proposed by Factiva (incl. The Financial Times, The Guar-
dian, The Economist, CNN, The New York Times, Washington Post, Le Monde, Le Figaro,
Agence France Presse, Frankfurter AllgemeineZeitung, SüddeutscheZeitung, Reuters,
Spiegel Online).]
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respondents in the UK answered that they were not familiar with the idea
(ITUC 2012). The vast majority of respondents in EU countries, therefore,
were able to take a position on a rather opaque financial regulatory issue.
In those early phases of the reform, financial industry groups, faced with
adverse public opinion, were not successful in vetoing policy change. In the
midst of the financial crisis, the dialogue among policy-makers and private
sector groups was generally more adversarial than it had reportedly been
during pre-crisis times. Expressing frustration about heightened public atten-
tion regarding the proposed FTT, one industry lobbyist complained that it was
‘difficult to have reasonable discussions if it becomes so much politicized’. The
context for regulatory debate had noticeably changed for private sector
groups and the mood swing in public opinion was clearly felt by industry lob-
byists. Public outrage and de-legitimization of the industry were clearly felt by
financial sector lobbyists, who perceived the tax as retribution for wrong-
doings that led to the crisis. In the words of another interviewee: ‘We are
the ones to be punished.’
Increased public attention to the regulatory reform process was
accompanied by divisions among policy-makers and the private sector. One
important way in which the regulatory environment had changed was that
policy-makers started to call industry groups’ expertise into question. Public
attention to financial debates had clearly weakened incentives for elected offi-
cials and politicians to openly heed demands coming from the financial
sector. Wolfgang Schäuble, the German finance minister, for example, dis-
missed arguments from the opposing camp in November 2011:
The objections made by some who claim it would mean a substantial drop in
employment and in the economy generally seem to rest on exaggerated and
sharply challenged projections – and, more important, ignore the potential of
such a tax to stabilize currency markets in a way to boost rather than damage
the real economy. (The Telegraph 2011)
Statements of industry lobbyists in Brussels and London corroborate the
story that their influence on the particular content of the proposed FTT
prior to the publication of the Commission’s first draft directive in September
2011 was rather limited. Before the financial crisis, industry groups were used
to exchanging information with Commission officials, even before the publi-
cation of draft directives. After the financial crisis, as this industry representa-
tive complained, there had been no pre-legislative discussion among financial
industry groups and Commission officials before the publication of the first
FTT draft proposal in September 2011, apart from the Commission’s public
consultation between February and April 2011. In the perception of another
industry representative, the Commission worked on the draft directive ‘in
complete isolation, not with the industry’.
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Financial sector participants were generally frustrated by the policy process
and their inability to exert influence. One interviewee stated that his associ-
ation was ‘having a very tough time’ when trying to engage in discussions
with policy-makers about the FTT. Other commentaries from financial lobby-
ists confirm that it was ‘difficult to have constructive discussions’ with Com-
mission officials and MEPs on the FTT. For industry lobbyists who reported
having meetings with Algirdas Šemeta, the Commissioner for Taxation, as
well as with Commission officials, discussions ‘did not have a significant
impact on the direction the Commission was traveling’. One disgruntled lob-
byist reported that the Commission was generally ‘dismissive’ about industry
concerns. This explains why industry representatives were irritated when they
read the first Commission draft. Private sector lobbyists reported that they
thought the Commission draft, once proposed, was ‘that bad, you have to
restart from scratch’, that ‘not a single measure [was] acceptable’, that it did
not ‘accurately reflect how the financial markets work’, and that the design
of the tax was ‘fundamentally flawed’.
Changes to the post-crisis financial regulatory environment also forced
financial industry groups to adapt their lobbying strategies. From the begin-
ning, financial industry groups saw their advocacy efforts directed at blocking
or vetoing any legislative proposal regarding an FTT largely curtailed. Aware of
the potentially negative consequences for their reputation, financial sector
groups did, for example, employ only limited ‘outside lobbying strategies’.
In the context of huge bailout costs using public money, the financial services
industry was facing serious reputational problems and saw itself deprived of
the usual lobbying repertoire, as one financial lobbyist reported:
It is very difficult for the banking sector for example to go all out and oppose an
FTT when they are beneficiaries of government bailouts … The financial sector
has found it very difficult to publicly articulate their opposition to the FTT
without seeming to be just serving their own interest. … the financial services
sector has such a bad reputation.
Private sector groups refrained, for instance, from publishing position papers
opposed to the FTT in order to avoid negative publicity.
Changed contextual conditions: low-salience politics
When legislative debate moved to the policy formulation stage, salience
slowly faded away, with the FTT making the headlines less and less often.
The decline in issue salience is clearly visible in Figure 1. An upsurge in interest
in the issue in 2012, when 11 member states signalled their willingness to
proceed with the introduction of an FTT by enhanced co-operation, was fol-
lowed by a steady decline in press coverage throughout 2013, until reaching,
by mid-2014, the lowest level of attention since the start of reform debates in
2009.
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The drop in public attention parallels the move of legislative debates from
the top of policy agendas to working group meetings. Shortly after the Com-
mission had presented a second draft directive for enhanced co-operation in
February 2013, negotiations moved to the Commission’s indirect taxation
working party. These working party meetings (among all 27 member states)
were characterized by a noticeable ‘quietening’ of regulatory debates with
much less public scrutiny. In addition, negotiations started to take place in
unofficial meetings among participating member states prior to the formal
working party meetings. Discussions about proposed legislation were
thereby narrowed down from a broader public debate to a limited circle of
participants and non-official working party papers. It is also indicative of
fading salience of the policy issue that in June 2013 the FTT was not included
on the agenda of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN), nor the
EU’s Summit.
When debates moved from high issue salience to lower issue salience and
from broad democratic debate toward special interest bargaining, new possi-
bilities opened up for exemption, delay and modification beneficial to indus-
try interests. It is therefore little surprising that industry groups started to step
up their lobbying efforts directed at member states negotiations in the
Council. According to one industry representative:
We haven’t even tried to contact the Commission on this. Parliament is an area
where we might be lobbying more but we haven’t done anything. We believe
that it is really the governments that are going to decide and primarily the
French and German governments.9
Reform discussions in informal meetings resulted in a perceived lack of
transparency in the decision-making process. Non-participating member
states criticized the negotiations as ‘closed process’, ‘a political deal nego-
tiated largely in secret’ (Financial Times 2014). In June 2012, Green MEP
and supporter of the FTT Lamberts expressed his frustration about the
policy process:
[I]t has become clear that the proposal for the tax, presented by the European
Commission in February, is being torn apart by governments with close relation-
ships to the financial lobbies. Since they [governments] are acting behind closed
doors, in ambassadors’meetings, in central bankers’ gatherings, beyond public
pressure and democratic accountability, they feel free to destroy the Commis-
sion’s ambitious proposals. (Lamberts 2013)
The success of noisy business politics
One effect of increased salience and actor plurality was that opponents of
an FTT were reticent in making a public case outright opposing an FTT in
the early phases of the policy process when the memory of the financial
crisis was still fresh. Yet, despite greatly improved chances for an FTT
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after the second Commission proposal in February 2013, and under con-
ditions of more quiet politics, financial industry groups changed their lobby-
ing strategy. It was then that industry groups started to actively push back,
launching ‘a concerted and broad attack’ against the FTT from March to
June 2013 (Persaud 2013). Industry representatives went public, warning
about the potentially harmful economic implications of the proposed
reform choosing frames that focused on public interests and societal
costs. First, industry groups engaged in noisy politics by distributing a
clearly understandable message to the broader public about the harmful
effects of the reform strongly backed up by scientific evidence. In early
2013, banks (Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley)
and their lobbying associations (the International Banking Federation and
the European Fund and Asset Management Association) published a
range of research reports presenting empirical evidence against an FTT. In
its research report ‘Financial Transaction Tax: how severe?’, Goldman
Sachs claimed the proposed FTT would lead to a massive tax burden for
the banking sector, amounting to €170 billion. The report further claimed
that ‘the burden of the FTT would fall on retail investors’ (Goldman Sachs
2013). Industry groups were also careful to highlight the undesirable societal
costs of the proposed tax reform. When arguing for exemptions from the
scope of the tax, industry groups typically argued that the inclusion of
the respective financial instruments within the scope of the tax would
lead to liquidity problems with detrimental consequences for the wider
economy. In a research report from March 2013, Deutsche Bank stated its
opposition to the proposed tax, presenting evidence that the FTT would
raise the cost of capital ‘for households, firms and even states’ and therefore
‘hurt the real economy’ (Deutsche Bank Research 2013). Several more
studies, press releases and commentaries in major newspapers brought
arguments and scientific evidence forward against the FTT (Bloomberg
Business 2013; Financial Times 2013a, 2013b).
In an effort to leverage their political influence, financial industry groups
also tried to tie their interests to those of other private sector groups indirectly
affected by the introduction of an FTT. With their expertise and credibility dis-
credited by the crisis, industry groups had to choose their coalition partners
wisely in order to be able to make convincing counter-arguments to the pro-
posed policy reforms. As such, financial sector groups in the eurozone delib-
erately chose not to organize joint campaigns with US- and UK-based financial
firms because there was a perception that arguments coming from the latter
were rather counterproductive in efforts to convince EU policymakers to
oppose an FTT. As one industry representative reported: ‘There is a risk that
lobbying … is not very helpful because it is all a bit the Anglo-Saxon conspi-
racy to preserve its financial markets … We share information but we are not
involved in any joint initiatives.’10 Although they refrained from joint
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campaigns with US- and UK-based firms, financial groups took advantage
of the counter-mobilization of non-financial groups within the business
community. Policy-makers were not eager to publicly support the finance
industry’s arguments opposing regulatory reform, but they equally shied
away from publicly supporting regulatory reforms that could be seen to
have negatively affected corporate activity and economic growth. A signifi-
cant number of actively mobilized against the introduction of an FTT. In
May 2013, German multinational companies including Bayer and Siemens
voiced their opposition to the proposed FTT, highlighting its damaging
effects for companies and the export-oriented German economy (Financial
Times 2013c). One financial industry representative explained the lobbying
strategy as follows:
The better way for the financial sector to address this topic is to get other parties
on board. When Deutsche Bank complains, people say it must be good but if
Siemens says it is detrimental to clients, you make a strong argument.11
Although non-ﬁnancial business actors were not the actual target of the regu-
lation, they feared that one of the downstream costs of the tax would be to
raise the cost of corporate debt. Rather than stressing the potential effects
of the tax on ﬁnancial markets, business associations emphasized the dama-
ging consequences for growth and corporate activity. Accordingly, the Amer-
ican Chamber of Commerce argued in letters sent to participating EUmember
states that the tax ‘will have serious implications not just for the ﬁnancial insti-
tutions but for the “real economy” – on businesses in every sector who legiti-
mately use ﬁnancial instruments in the normal course of their business’. This
argument was made in a non-public paper on the FTT from April 2013, pro-
vided by a London-based bank lobbyist. Citing these arguments ﬁnancial
sector groups actively lobbied against the FTT – a campaign that Der
Spiegel, a German weekly news magazine, described as a ‘revolt’ aimed at
delaying its implementation (Hesse and Pauly 2012). Next to business
groups, ﬁnancial industry groups found another important ally in the commu-
nity of central bankers. Financial sector groups repeatedly criticized the pro-
posed FTT during advisory groups meetings with European Central Bank
(ECB) staff in spring 2013 (Corporate Europe Observatory 2013). In April and
May 2013, then, the heads of the German, French and British central banks
publicly expressed their reservations towards an FTT (Financial Times 2013d;
The Telegraph 2013). After reports and lobbying by the ﬁnancial industry
had shed considerable doubt on the desirability of the tax, political support
clearly faded. In May 2014, German Finance Minister Schäuble declared that
the options, interests and situation of the various participants were so diver-
gent that states should start by introducing a limited taxation of shares and
some derivatives (Wall Street Journal 2013).
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Conclusions
In the post-crisis context, heads of states and governments became interested
in the FTT as a populist policy measure to appease public opinion. In those
early phases of the reform, advocacy efforts of financial sector groups,
faced with adverse public opinion aimed at blocking regulatory change,
were largely frustrated. Industry groups saw themselves deprived of their
full lobbying repertoire and largely refrained from outside strategies. This
early phase of the reform debate clearly evokes the extent to which regulatory
capture by concentrated industry interests is constrained, both by heightened
salience and interest group plurality. Contextual conditions changed dramati-
cally when the regulatory debate moved to the actual policy formulation
stage. Under much less public scrutiny, negotiations among the 11 participat-
ing member states were much more conducive to private sector lobbying
than the previous debate. Working group meetings received, for example,
considerable less press coverage than previous FTT debates. This ‘quietening’
of the policy debate combined with a framing strategy and a more encom-
passing and diverse coalition of stakeholders was key to the industry’s lobby-
ing success. Industry groups started to exercise instrumental power during the
negotiation phase among Council working groups, by presenting scientific
evidence against a transaction tax, by pointing out potential societal costs
and by forming strategic lobby alliances with central business groups such
as Bayer and Siemens. The mobilization of groups, not directly affected by
the proposed regulatory reforms, positively affected the financial industry’s
advocacy efforts. Owing to the successful framing of the tax as harmful to
economic growth, the distribution of scientific evidence to back up the argu-
ment and the active opposition of a coalition among industry and business
groups, the proposed tax eventually resulted in a diluted compromise.
Latest reform proposals indicate that the FTT is likely to miss the mark of effec-
tively raising revenue and tackling speculative trading. Far from a long-term
shift in the balance of power, developments in financial regulatory reforms
after the crisis seem to be more of a temporary setback for industry groups,
following the usual boom and bust cycle.
This analysis followed a deviant case logic, since the lobbying success of
business groups against an FTT is puzzling in light of the literature, which
led us to expect that business groups lose if subjected to public scrutiny.
The case thus provides a unique opportunity to fine-tune existing theory.
First and foremost, it provides empirical support to the noisy business politics
hypothesis that postulates that the business community may successfully
employ framing when faced with new regulations. A framing strategy that
linked industry arguments against regulation to the well-being of the
broader economy was the winning strategy when aimed at national govern-
ments concerned with the legitimacy of their public policy decisions. Framing
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strategies aimed at a broader public are particularly useful for business groups
when issue salience declines. In the context of low salience, business groups
can benefit from using the media to convince policy-makers of their view of
the policy issue at hand (Boräng and Naurin 2015). Industry groups’ use of
outside lobbying strategies was much more constrained in the context
of high salience. The study therefore also shows that within case variance in
salience is important in understanding lobbying success.
The caveat here is that it is not easy to quantify and conclusively ascertain
the precise influence of group advocacy in the course of the financial reforms.
Critics may argue that reform ambitions shrank because governments
‘learned’ that the proposal of a uniform tax on very different types of trans-
actions would potentially cause serious malfunctions, and that it would be
more effective and technically simpler to tax net revenues of the financial
sector (see, for example, Grahl and Lysandrou 2003, 2013). However, although
alternative policy solutions to the FTT such as the financial activities tax (FAT)
were well known, not one of the main political players seriously considered
replacing the FTT proposal by an FAT proposal.
Second, the reform proposal might also have been diluted because the
Commission feared that even more member states would opt out if the pro-
posal was not watered down. It might indeed be overstretching the evidence
to conclude that the lobbying efforts of the financial industry alone were deci-
sive. However, noisy business politics most likely made it easier for political
actors to use the same frame employed by industry groups to support a
diluted FTT.
Third, one may argue that it has not been the instrumental power but the
structural power of financial capital that eroded the ambition of the initial FTT
proposal. While instrumental power is based on the lobbying capacity of
business groups, structural power refers to the structural dependence of capi-
talist democracies on firm investments, which provides the latter with political
leverage even if financial sector groups do not actively engage in advocacy
(Culpepper 2015; Culpepper and Reinke 2014; Woll 2014). Research evolving
around the concept of ‘financialization’ has identified the growing centrality
of the financial industry as a major trend in socioeconomic developments
(Krippner 2011). Owing to the centrality of finance capital in modern market
societies, any attempt to re-regulate financial industry activities must therefore
be understood as a direct challenge to the vested interests of finance capital-
ism. More importantly, re-regulations in the field of finance are likely to have
repercussions not only for the financial industry but for the wider business
community alike. Business groups are therefore more likely to align with finan-
cial sector groups’ advocacy efforts (Pagliari and Young 2015). It is therefore
likely that a combination of instrumental and structural power of financial
industry groups may explain why lobbying demands of EU-based industry
groups were eventually successful in diluting the proposed reform.
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Notes
1. A notable exception is the article by Keller (2016).
2. Proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of financial transaction tax
and amending Directive 2008/7/EC, Brussels, 28 September 2011.
3. Interview with an NGO representative, 13 September 2013.
4. Internal and non-official paper provided by financial lobbyist, June 2013.
5. Interview with industry representative, Brussels, 22 May 2013.
6. Interview with Commission official, Brussels, 12 May 2013.
7. This section is based on interviews with industry lobbyists conducted in Brussels
and London in May and June 2013.
8. I have selected the three key member states for illustration purposes and
because their stance on the negotiations can be considered particularly relevant
to the reform outcome.
9. Interview with industry representative, London, 20 June 2013.
10. Ibid.
11. Interview with financial industry lobbyist, 16 May 2013.
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